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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. William Gray, Jr. *
Katherine E. Ramsey **
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2012 session of the Virginia General Assembly enacted
wills, trusts, and estates legislation that (i) clarified the fiduciary
responsibilities of a directed trustee, (ii) authorized individuals to
create trusts for their own benefit and protect the trust assets
from their creditors, (iii) permits the trustee of a grantor trust to
pay the grantor's income tax without causing the trust assets to
be included in the grantor's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes, (iv) allows a trustee to exercise a distribution power in
favor of a beneficiary by adding the trust assets to another trust
for the beneficiary's benefit, and (v) allows an out-of-state execu-
tor or testamentary trustee to deal with the decedent's Virginia
real property without an ancillary administrator. In addition,
Virginia's statutes relating to wills, trusts, estates, and fiduciar-
ies were recodified, effective October 1, 2012. Eight other legisla-
tive enactments and six opinions of the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia during the twelve months ended June 1, 2012, rounded out a
busy year in this field.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Re-Codification of Title 64.1
Perhaps the most significant development of the 2012 General
Assembly session occurred almost without comment when the
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legislature approved the Virginia Code Commission's recommen-
dation to consolidate all statutory provisions relating to wills,
trusts, estates, and fiduciaries into a single new Virginia Code
volume: title 64.2, "Wills, Trusts and Fiduciaries."1
The new title 64.2 combines the provisions of current title 64.1
(wills and estates) with those in current title 26 (fiduciaries gen-
erally), title 31 (guardian and ward), and selected portions of title
37.2 (medical directives and other health care issues) and title 55
(Uniform Acts and other statutes generally applicable to fiduciar-
ies). The new title consists of twenty-seven chapters grouped into
five subtitles:
Subtitle I: General Provisions (containing definitions appli-
cable throughout the title and provisions that apply broadly
to wills, trusts, estates, and fiduciaries), Virginia Code sec-
tions 64.2-100 through 64.2-108;
Subtitle II: Wills and Decedents' Estates (addressing the
passage of property by intestacy, will, or nonprobate
means), Virginia Code sections 64.2-200 through 64.2-620;
Subtitle III: Trusts (containing various Uniform Acts that
govern the creation and management of Virginia trusts, in-
cluding those dealing with trusts, principal and income, and
institutional funds), Virginia Code sections 64.2-700
through 64.2-1108;
Subtitle IV: Fiduciaries and Guardians (containing rules
applicable to fiduciary relationships such as powers of at-
torney and guardianships and to the Commissioner of Ac-
counts), Virginia Code sections 64.2-1200 through 64.2-
2120; and,
Subtitle V: Provisions Applicable to Probate and Nonpro-
bate Transfers (including simultaneous death, persons pre-
sumed dead, slayers, disclaimers, and releases of powers of
appointment), Virginia Code sections 64.2-2200 through
64.2-2704.2
1. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 614, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-
100 to -2704 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
2. Id.
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The stated intent of the Code Commission recommendation
was to modernize and consolidate those related provisions of Vir-
ginia law without making other substantive changes in the law.3
The legislation contains several rules designed to assure that re-
numbering and relocating the various statutes will not adversely
affect existing documents or the rights or responsibilities arising
from them:
1. All references to a former statute will be construed to
apply to its new or renumbered counterpart dealing with
the same issues;
2. Agency and departmental regulations will continue in
effect to the extent not inconsistent with the recodified leg-
islation and will be deemed to be regulations adopted under
that legislation;
3. In recommending the first re-codification of these provisions since 1968, the Vir-
ginia Code Commission stated that it intended "to (i) organize the laws in more logical
manner; (ii) remove obsolete and duplicative provisions; and (iii) improve the structure
and clarity of the laws pertaining to wills, succession, descent of property, trusts, and fidu-
ciaries." REPORT OF THE VA. CODE COMM'N, RECODIFICATION OF TITLE 64.1 OF THE CODE OF
VA., S. Doc. No. 15, at 1 (2011). For example, the statute governing passage of title to in-
testate real estate is revised to eliminate such archaic terms as "real estate of inher-
itance," "in parcenary," and "moiety." The relevant provision currently reads in part as
follows:
When any person having title to any real estate of inheritance shall die intes-
tate as to such estate, it shall descend and pass in parcenary to such of his
kindred, male and female, in the following course:
First. To the surviving spouse of the intestate, unless the intestate is sur-
vived by children or their descendants, one or more of whom are not children
or their descendants of the surviving spouse, in which case two-thirds of such
estate shall pass to all the intestate's children and their descendants and the
remaining one-third of such estate shall pass to the intestate's surviving
spouse.... [provisions for more remote successors]
Fifth. If there be none such, then one moiety shall go to the paternal, the oth-
er to the maternal kindred, of the intestate ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2011). The recodified statute will
read:
A. The real estate of any decedent not effectively disposed of by will descends
and passes by intestate succession in the following course:
1. To the surviving spouse of the decedent, unless the decedent is sur-
vived by children or their descendants, one or more of whom are not
children or their descendants of the surviving spouse, in which case,
two-thirds of the estate descends and passes to the decedent's children
and their descendants, and one-third of the estate descends and passes
to the surviving spouse .... [provisions for more remote successors]
5. If there is none of the foregoing, then one-hall of the estate descends
and passes to the paternal kindred and one-half descends and passes
to the maternal kindred of the decedent ....
Id. § 64.2-200 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
2012]
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3. The Virginia Code Commission will have authority to
revise other acts of the 2012 General Assembly to conform
to the new numbering;
4. The repeal of the prior provisions will not affect any
act or offense done or committed, any penalty incurred, or
any right established, accrued, or accruing on or before the
effective date of title 64.2 nor any proceeding, prosecution,
suit, or action pending then. Despite the repeal, current law
is continued in effect for the prosecution of any offense if an
essential element occurred before the repeal date;
5. Any notice given, recognizance taken, or process or
writ issued before the effective date but given, taken, or to
be returned to a day after the effective date will be as valid
as if title 64.2 had been effective during the entire period;
6. A judgment invalidating any portion of title 64.2 will
not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of the stat-
ute; and,
7. The legislation will not affect the validity, enforceabil-
ity, or legality of any instrument that existed prior to the ef-
fective date or of any fiduciary relationship or right estab-
lished or accrued under the instrument or by the
relationship that existed before the repeal.4
Title 64.2 became effective October 1, 2012, three months later
than the normal effective date for 2012 legislation.5 For conven-
ience and ease of understanding, current statutory references in
this article parenthetically refer to the previous organizational
system.
B. Directed Trustees
Settlors often want to name someone to oversee or direct the
actions of the trustee in one or more areas of trust administration
(e.g., investments, distributions, retention/sale of specific trust
assets, voting of stock held in trust). This can be for a variety of
reasons, but often the settlor simply wishes to employ the ser-
vices of a professional trustee to administer the trust, while leav-
4. Ch. 614, cls. 2-7, 9-10, 2012 Va. Acts .
5. Id., ci. 12.
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ing certain sensitive decisions to a family member or friend with-
out imposing the normal fiduciary constraints applicable to trus-
tees.
However, the existence of such a trust director (also sometimes
called a trust protector or trust advisor) can place the trustee in a
difficult position under current Virginia law. The trust director is
only presumptively a fiduciary; if the trust terms allow, she need
not act in good faith or in the beneficiaries' best interests. On the
other hand, the trustee must follow the trust director's instruc-
tions, even if they are contrary to the trustee's own fiduciary du-
ties, unless the direction is "manifestly contrary" to the terms of
the trust instrument or following the direction would constitute a
"serious" breach of a fiduciary duty] In other words, each time
the trustee receives a direction from the trust director, the trus-
tee must determine whether it can be followed. If there is any
doubt as to the proper course of action, a cautious trustee will
seek aid and guidance from the court in order to protect itself,
particularly if the trust director is not a fiduciary. Not only does
this burden the court system, but it can cause tension between
the trustee, trust director, and beneficiaries.
Several states already had statutes addressing this problem.'
Virginia followed their lead in 2012 by substantially revising its
directed trustee statute.9 Under the new law, trustees can be
completely protected from fiduciary liability when following the
directions of a "trust director," that is, any person other than a
trustee who is given power by the trust instrument to direct the
trustee on any matter.10
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(D) (In-
terim Supp. 2012)).
7. Id. § 64.2-770(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(B) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
8. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10808 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313
(2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-
7-501 (2009); IND. CODE § 30-4-3-9 (Repl. Vol. 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-275 (Lex-
isNexis Repl, Vol. 2011); NEv. REV. STAT. § 163.554 to -5553 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum.
Supp. 2011); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5808.08, 5815.25 (LexisNexis 2006); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 130.735 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 55-1B-1 to -7. (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-15-
808, 35-3-122, 35-3-123 (2007 & Supp. 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-808(b), 4-10-715 to -
718 (2011).
9. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 562, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-548.08 (Interim Supp. 2012) (recodified effective Oct. 1, 2012, at id. § 64.2-770
(Repl. Vol. 2012))).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(E)(1)
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To afford this protection, (i) the settlor must specifically incor-
porate Virginia Code section 64.2-770(E) (formerly section 55-
548.08(E)) into the trust instrument (or all interested parties
must agree to incorporate the provisions by specific reference in a
nonjudicial settlement agreement)," and (ii) the trustee must not
be guilty of willful misconduct or gross negligence in following the
trust director's direction. 2 In that event, unless the trust provides
otherwise, the trustee's only fiduciary obligations are to ensure
that the requisite language is in the document, that the trust di-
rector is acting within the scope of his authority, and, in cases
where the trustee may act only with the trust director's consent
or direction, to request that consent or direction."
As a matter of general trust law, a directed trustee may be re-
lieved of liability only on the condition and to the extent that the
trust director assumes fiduciary responsibility. 4 Therefore, if Vir-
ginia Code section 64.2-770(E) is invoked (and in all other cases if
the instrument does not expressly provide otherwise), the trust
(Interim Supp. 2012)). This relationship can take several forms. For example, the trustee
may be free to act except as otherwise directed by the trust director, or the trustee may be
prohibited from acting without the trust director's express consent or direction. See id. §
64.2-770(E)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(E)(2) (Interim Supp. 2012)).
However, a person is not a trust director merely by holding a power of appointment over
trust assets. Id. § 64.2-770(E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(E)(1) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
11. Id. § 64.2-770(E) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(E) (Interim Supp.
2012)). Virginia is one, if not the only, state to expressly allow incorporation of the statute
by nonjudicial settlement agreement. This ability will be an important tool in the admin-
istration of trusts that became irrevocable before July 1, 2012.
12. Id. § 64.2-770(E)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(E)(2) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
13. See id. The trustee is not liable for any loss resulting directly or indirectly from
the trust director's failure to respond. Id. The directed trustee has no separate duty to (i)
monitor the trust director's conduct; (ii) provide the trust director with information, other
than material facts related to the trust administration that the trust director expressly
requests in writing; (iii) inform or warn anyone (including the trust director) of any disa-
greement between the trustee and the trust director regarding any action or direction by
the trust director; (iv) attempt to prevent the trust director from directing or acting; or (v)
compel the trust director to redress any perceived breach of fiduciary duty arising from
any action or direction. See id. § 64.2-770(E)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-
548.08(E)(3) (Interim Supp. 2012)).
14. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. B (1959) (stating that, when di-
rected, trustees "ordinarily will be liable for a loss resulting from failure to comply with
the trust provision, and ordinarily will not be liable for action or inaction resulting from
compliance."). See generally Richard W. Nenno, Directed Trusts: Can Directed Trustees
Limit Their Liability?, PROB. & PROP., November/December 2007, at 45 (outlining the var-
ious approaches to directed trustee liability and concluding that while "[sjerving as a di-
rected trustee is fraught with peril . .. directed trustees can do much to limit their liabil-
ity.").
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director has a fiduciary duty to act in good faith with regard to
the trust purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries and is li-
able for any loss that results from a breach of that duty.15
In sum, Virginia settlors now have two options. They may fol-
low the current statutory default rule, authorizing the trustee to
follow a third party's directions only after determining inde-
pendently that the direction is not manifestly contrary to the
trust terms and does not constitute a serious breach of trust. As
an alternative, they may expressly incorporate the new statute
into the trust document to shift fiduciary responsibility and po-
tential liability from the trustee to the trust director. If a benefi-
ciary objects to any directed action under the new rule, the claim
will lie solely against the trust director, not the trustee.
16
The new statute is an improvement over the uncertainty that
existed under prior law. It maintains the settlor's ability to decide
with whom the fiduciary responsibility for certain decisions
should lie and better ensures that the trust director's instructions
will be followed, while reducing the number of aid and guidance
suits filed by trustees and generally improving relations between
the parties.
C. Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts
Virginia law has long permitted a settlor to create an irrevoca-
ble discretionary trust for a third party and have the trust assets
protected from the beneficiary's creditors. 7 Similar treatment his-
torically has not been available for so-called "self-settled" trusts
where the settlor is also a trust beneficiary.8 Over the years,
however, several important exceptions have developed in Virgin-
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-770(D), (E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.08(D),
(E)(1) (Interim Supp. 2012)).
16. See id. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, any actions taken by
the directed trustee pertaining to matters within the scope of the trust director's authori-
ty, "including confirming that the trust director's directions have been carried out and re-
cording and reporting actions taken pursuant to the trust director's direction," are pre-
sumptively considered administrative and are not to be considered as either monitoring or
participating in the trust director's actions. Id. § 64.2-770(E)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly
id. § 55-548.08(E)(4) (Interim Supp. 2012)).
17. Id. §§ 64.2-742, -743, -746 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. §§ 55-545.01, .02, .04 (In-
terim Supp. 2012)).
18. See id. § 64.2-747 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.05 (Cur. Supp. 2011)).
20121
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ia, 9 and other states have enacted statutes offering such protec-
tion. Commentators questioned whether any continuing prohibi-
tion on creditor protection for self-settled trusts was justified.2 '
Against this background, the 2012 General Assembly author-
ized creditor protection for self-settled trusts.22 As of July 1, 2012,
a settlor may transfer assets to a "qualified self-settled spend-
thrift trust" in Virginia and retain the right to receive future dis-
tributions from the trust at the discretion of an independent trus-
tee without exposing the assets to claims of the settlor's
creditors.23 If certain requirements are met, the settlor's creditors
may not set aside the transfer under section 55-80 on the theory
it was intended to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors 4 or assert a
claim "against any trustee, trust adviser, trust director, or any
19. For example, the prohibition excludes individual retirement accounts, which are
merely a tax-favored form of self-settled revocable spendthrift trust. See id. § 34-34 (Repl.
Vol. 2011). Another exception protects a settlor's contingent remainder interest in certain
inter vivos trusts created for a spouse when the spouse subsequently predeceased the set-
tlor. See id. § 64.2-747 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.05(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2011))
(discussed in J. William Gray, Jr. & Katherine E. Ramsey, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 46 U. RiCH. L. REV. 243, 243-45 (2011) [hereinafter Gray
& Ramsey]). Section 55-545.05 was recodified effective October 1, 2012, at Virginia Code
section 64.2-747, but subsection (B)(3) was omitted inadvertently. The authors expect this
error to be corrected through a technical bill in 2013. A settler also can protect assets
from his creditors simply by retitling them with a spouse as tenants by the entireties or by
creating a self-settled spendthrift trust in another state that permits it. In addition, the
current law frustrates many settlors' estate planning goals. A person considering a large
gift for estate tax planning purposes might hesitate out of concern that he could need the
property unexpectedly at a later date. If the donor retains so much as a remote discretion-
ary interest, however, current law exposes the entire trust to the claims of the donor's
creditors. That result under state law would cause all of the trust assets to be subject to
federal estate tax at the donor's death, thus defeating the original tax purpose behind set-
ting up the trust. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; see also Outwin v.
Comm'r, 76 T.C. 153 (1981), acq., 1982-1 C.B. 2; Paolozzi v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 182 (1954),
acq. 1962-1 C.B. 4; Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293.
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570 to 3576 (2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010);
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors'Rights in Trusts, 53
HASTINGS L. J. 287 (2001-02).
22. See Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 555, 2012 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-545.03:2, -545.03:3, -545.05 (Repl. Vol. 2012)) (recodified effective Oct. 1,
2012, at id. §§ 64.2-745.1, -745.2, -747 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-745.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:2(A) (In-
terim Supp. 2012)).
24. Id. § 64.2-745.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:2(C) (Interim Supp.
2012)). Existing creditors, however, may bring a challenge under sections 55-80 or 55-81
on the ground that the transfer to the trust rendered the settler insolvent. Id.
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person involved in the counseling, drafting, preparation, or execu-
tion of, or transfers" of property to, the trust.25
In order to be recognized as a "qualified self-settled spendthrift
trust," a trust must have the following characteristics:
1. It must be an irrevocable trust created during the settlor's
lifetime;
2. The instrument must expressly incorporate Virginia law to
govern the validity, construction, and administration of the trust;
and it must include a spendthrift provision that restrains both
voluntary and involuntary transfer of the settlor's "qualified in-
terest;"
3. There must be at least one "qualified trustee" at all times;
4. At all times when distributions may be made to the settlor
pursuant to the settlor's qualified interest there must be at least
one other beneficiary to whom distributions may be made;26 and
5. The settlor may not have the right to disapprove trust dis-
tributions.27
Only the settlor's qualified interest is protected from creditor
claims. 8 A "qualified interest" includes only the settlor's entitle-
ment "to receive distributions of income, principal, or both, in the
sole discretion of an independent qualified trustee."29 A "qualified
trustee" must (i) be either a Virginia resident individual or a legal
entity authorized to engage in trust business in Virginia; and (ii)
materially participate in the trust's administration in Virginia.
25. Id. § 64.2-745.1(E) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:2(E) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
26. Presumably, the additional beneficiary would prevent the trustee from abusing his
or her distribution discretion in favor of the settlor.
27. See VA. COnE ANN. § 64.2-745.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:3(A)
(Interim Supp. 2012)).
28. See id.; id. § 64.2-745.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:2(A) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
29. Id. § 64.2-745.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:3(A) (Interim Supp.
2012)). Mandatory distributions are not protected, nor are distributions made in the dis-
cretion of a non-independent qualified trustee. See id. A settlor may have both a qualified
interest, which is protected from creditors, and another interest, which is not protected, in
the same trust. Id.
30. Id. Examples include maintaining or arranging for custody of at least some trust
property within the state, maintaining at least a portion of the trust records in Virginia, or
preparing or arranging for the preparation of the trust's fiduciary income tax returns in
Virginia. Id. A qualified trustee's distribution authority cannot be subject to the direction
20121
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An "independent qualified trustee" (who may make discretion-
ary distributions to the settlor) is a qualified trustee who is not,
and whose actions are not, subject to direction by: (i) an individu-
al not residing in Virginia; (ii) an entity not authorized under
Virginia law to engage in trust business within the state; (iii) the
settlor; (iv) the settlor's spouse, parent, issue, sibling, employee,
or subordinate employee;3 (v) a business entity in which the set-
tlor holds at least thirty percent of all voting interests; or (vi) a
subordinate employee of a business entity in which the settlor is
an executive."
If a qualified trustee or qualified independent trustee ceases to
serve for any reason, the position must be filled by an eligible
successor designated pursuant to the trust agreement or, if none,
by an eligible person designated by all of the qualified beneficiar-
ies of the trust, or otherwise by an eligible person appointed by
the court pursuant to its statutory authority.33
The new statute also contains provisions to protect the claims
of the settlor's existing creditors,3 4 to prevent future creditors
of a third party (such as a trust protector or trust director) who would not also meet the
requirements of a qualified trustee if he were a trustee. Id. If one of the reasons behind
this requirement was to ensure trust distribution decisions are made, directly or indirect-
ly, in Virginia, it does not go far enough. The statute requires only that the trust have at
least one qualified trustee at all times; it does not require that the qualified trustee partic-
ipate in distribution decisions at all. Thus, it should be possible for the agreement to pro-
vide that all distribution decisions will be made by one or more nonqualified trustees or
trust directors outside of Virginia until distributions to the settlor may be desired, at
which time an independent qualified trustee would assume control over the distribution
decisions with respect to the settlor.
31. The distinction between employee and subordinate employee for this purpose is
not clear.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-745.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id § 55-545.03:3(A) (In-
terim Supp. 2012)).
33. Id. § 64.2-745.2(B), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:3(B), (C) (Inter-
im Supp. 2012)). The qualified trustee who makes the trust eligible for self-settled spend-
thrift protection may, but need not, also be an independent qualified trustee. As a practi-
cal matter, this means a settlor who would like to retain only the possibility of future
distributions might create an irrevocable trust for the benefit of others and name an initial
qualified trustee only for administrative purposes in order to obtain spendthrift protec-
tion, while reserving all current distribution decisions to non-qualified trustees. An inde-
pendent qualified trustee could be appointed at a later date pursuant to the terms of the
trust, if and when distributions to the settlor become desirable.
34. As is the case under current law, pre-existing claims may be enforced against the
trust under section 55-82 for five years after the date of funding. See id. § 64.2-745.1(D)
(Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:2(D) (Interim Supp. 2012)). If the settlor makes
more than one transfer to the same trust, a separate five-year limitations period begins on
the date of each transfer, and each distribution to a beneficiary is deemed to have been
made from the latest transfer. See id. § 64.2-745.1(F) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-
[Vol. 47:343
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from claiming that the settlor's interest makes the trust revoca-
ble,35 and to avoid federal transfer tax problems that would arise
if the settlor were treated as the owner of part, but not all, of his
qualified interest.
Only time will tell if the new self-settled spendthrift trust rules
will be embraced by planners and their clients. At first glance,
they appear most useful to those Virginia residents who are only
mildly concerned about potential future creditors or who wish on-
ly to make large gifts for tax purposes while retaining the possi-
bility of benefiting from the assets in the future if needed. These
individuals now should be able to establish trusts in Virginia ra-
ther than be forced either to deal with advisors and trustees in
545.03:2(F) (Interim Supp. 2012)). If an existing trust first meets the requirements of a
qualified self-settled spendthrift trust when its administration is moved to Virginia, the
five-year period for all prior transfers will begin on the date Virginia administration com-
mences. See id. § 64.2-745.1(G) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:2(G) (Interim
Supp. 2012)). Note, it is difficult to reconcile this trust domestication rule with the plain
language of section 55-545.03:3(A), which defines a qualified self-settled spendthrift trust
as one that has "at all times" had a qualified trustee (i.e., a Virginia resident who conducts
at least a material portion of the trust's administration in this state) and that is governed
by a trust instrument that "expressly incorporates" Virginia law. See id. § 64.2-745.2(A)
(Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:3(A) (Interim Supp. 2012)).
35. See id. § 64.2-747(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.05(A)(1) (Cum.
Supp. 2012)). A self-settled spendthrift trust will not be deemed revocable because the set-
tlor has:
1. a qualified interest,
2. a power, effective only upon death, to appoint to anyone other than the settlor's es-
tate or its creditors,
3. a right to receive distributions pursuant to an ascertainable standard,
4. a right to receive a specific annual percentage (not greater than five percent) of the
initial trust value or the value determined periodically pursuant to the instrument,
5. a right to remove and replace trustees, or
6. an interest in a qualified charitable remainder trust or personal residence trust or a
qualified annuity interest;
or because a trustee has the ability to pay:
1. the settlor's debts, estate administration expenses, and any estate or inheritance
tax after the settlor's death, or
2. the settlor's income tax liability on trust income.
See id. § 64.2-745.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03:3(D) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
36. For purposes of the self-settled spendthrift trust rules, a beneficiary who has the
right to withdraw his entire beneficial interest in the trust will be treated as its settlor to
the extent of that interest once the withdrawal right lapses. See id. § 64.2-744(E) (Repl.
Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.03(E) (Interim Supp. 2012)). This provides creditor pro-
tection for the beneficiary's entire interest rather than only for the portion that does not
exceed the "five and five" power exclusion or gift tax annual exclusion, as would be the
case under former section 55-545.05(B)(2). See id.
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more debtor-friendly states or, more likely, to forgo the associated
planning opportunities entirely. However, those with significant
financial worries most likely will continue to seek the greater pro-
tection afforded by the laws of more established "haven" states or
off-shore jurisdictions.
D. Tax Reimbursement by Grantor Trust
If the settlor of an irrevocable trust is treated as the owner of
the trust assets for federal income tax purposes, the trust's in-
come and capital gains are taxed to the settlor even if he or she
has not retained any beneficial interest in the trust.3' The result-
ing tax liability can work a significant hardship on a settlor who
does not have other resources with which to pay it. Virginia law
had no provision allowing the trustee to reimburse the settlor for
any portion of that liability unless the trust instrument expressly
authorized reimbursement. The 2012 General Assembly, howev-
er, amended the Virginia Uniform Principal and Income Act to
change the default rule. 8 A trustee now generally may make dis-
cretionary distributions of principal to pay the settlor's income
tax attributable to the trust income, unless the trust agreement
provides otherwise or unless the trustee's action would reduce or
limit any charitable income, estate, or gift tax deduction allowed
for contributions to the trust."9
Ordinarily a settlor's creditors may reach the maximum
amount that can be distributed to or for the settlor's benefit from
any irrevocable trust he has created.40 So that a trustee's exercise
of its new discretionary power would not cause creditor problems
for the settlor, the General Assembly also amended the self-
settled spendthrift trust provisions of the Virginia Uniform Trust
Code to confirm that a trustee's ability to pay, or reimburse the
37. See I.R.C. §§ 671 to 677 (2006).
38. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 718, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 55-277.26, -545.05 (Interim Supp. 2012)) (recodified effective Oct. 1, 2012, at id. §§
64.2-1025, -747 (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1025(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-277.26(C) (Inter-
im Supp. 2012)).
40. Id. § 64.2-747(A)(2) (Repi. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-545.05(A)(2) (Repl. Vol.
2007)).
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settlor for, tax on trust income or principal will not, without
more, entitle a creditor or assignee of the settlor to reach any por-
tion of the trust.
41
E. Decanting of Trust Assets
A trustee with discretionary distribution power over income or
principal "decants" a trust when it distributes trust assets to a
new trust for the beneficiary. Though decanting can be seen as a
trustee's exercise of a special power of appointment, it had not
been statutorily authorized in Virginia. 2 In 2012, however, the
General Assembly followed the lead of several other states and
adopted its own decanting statute.43 Unless the trust instrument
expressly provides otherwise, the trustee of any irrevocable trust
administered under Virginia law may exercise a discretionary
power to make distributions to or for the benefit of a current trust
beneficiary by appointing all or part of the principal or income of
the original trust in favor of a trustee of a second trust.4
41. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 718, 2012 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-545.05(A)(2) (Interim Supp. 2012)) (recodified effective Oct. 1, 2012, at id. §
64.2-747(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012)). This amendment also may help to avoid any claim that a
trust in which the settlor retains no other interest should nevertheless be includable in
the settlor's gross estate for federal tax purposes because a portion of it is available to pay
claims of the settlor's creditors. See generally I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1(b)(2) (2012); Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-27 I.R.B. 7.
42. In theory, this falls within the trustee's discretionary power to make distributions
and can be seen as the exercise of a special power of appointment in a fiduciary capacity.
Decanting can be a very useful tool, particularly for older trusts with antiquated language
or where a change in law or circumstances not anticipated by the settlor makes continued
administration of the original trust difficult. Decanting also can be seen as contrary to a
trustee's fiduciary duties and a possible violation of the settlor's intent. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 19.14 cmt. f
(2011) (endorsing decanting as an inherent fiduciary power). See also Phipps v. Palm
Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299, 301 (Fla. 1940) ('The power vested in a trustee to create an
estate in fee includes the power to create or appoint any estate less than a fee unless the
donor clearly indicates a contrary intent.").
43. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 559, 2012 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
548.16:1) (Interim Supp. 2012) (recodified effective Oct. 1, 2012, at id. § 64.2-778.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2012)).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(B) (In-
terim Supp. 2012)). The trustee need not seek court approval to exercise this decanting
power. Id. The trustee may exercise a decanting power whether or not there is a current
need to make distributions under the terms of the original trust, and the second trust may
be created specifically to receive decanted assets. Id.
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The second trust must be created by an irrevocable lifetime or
testamentary instrument 45 that meets the following require-
ments:
1. Its beneficiaries may include only beneficiaries of the
original trust. The trustee's distribution power must be exer-
cisable in favor of the same current beneficiaries and, unless
the court approves otherwise, subject to the same ascertaina-
ble standard as in the original trust;6
2. A beneficiary who has only a future interest in the orig-
inal trust may not have that interest converted to a present
interest in the second trust;
4 7
3. The second trust may not "reduce any fixed income, an-
nuity, or unitrust interest of a beneficiary in the original
trust;
'48
4. The second trust may not contain any provision that
would have prevented a contribution to the original trust
from qualifying for the marital or charitable deduction for
federal tax purposes or would have reduced the amount de-
ductible;49
5. If contributions to the original trust qualified for the
gift tax annual per-donee exclusion or the "age 21" exclusion,
the second trust may not delay vesting of those contributions
in the beneficiary;50
6. If a beneficiary has a power of withdrawal over the orig-
inal trust, either the second trust must provide an identical
withdrawal power or sufficient property must remain in the
original trust to satisfy the power;5' and,
45. Id. § 64.2-778.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(A) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
46. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(1), (2) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(1), (2)
(Interim Supp. 2012)).
47. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(3) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
48. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(4) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
49. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(5) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
50. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(6) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(6) (Interim
Supp. 2012)). The "age 21" exclusion is codified at 26 U.S.C. sections 2503(b) and 2503(c).
51. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(7) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(7) (Interim
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7. The second trust may give a current beneficiary of the
original trust a power of appointment, including the power to
appoint to persons who were not beneficiaries of either
trust .
A trustee may not exercise a decanting power if the trustee is
(i) an individual eligible to receive distributions of income or prin-
cipal currently or upon termination of the trust, (ii) an individual
whose legal obligation to support a beneficiary may be satisfied
by such current distributions, or (iii) a trustee who may be re-
moved by a current trust beneficiary and replaced with a succes-
sor trustee who is a "related or subordinate party" with respect to
that beneficiary under federal tax rules." The power must be ex-
ercised by majority action of the eligible trustees or by a special
fiduciary appointed by the court if no trustee is eligible to act or if
any trustee so requests.
54
Eligible trustees may exercise a decanting power by (i) signing
and acknowledging a written instrument setting forth the man-
ner of exercising the power, the terms of the second trust, and its
effective date; and (ii) filing the instrument with the records of
the original trust.5 Unless all qualified beneficiaries of the origi-
nal trust waive notice, the trustee must notify the grantor of the
original trust, its qualified beneficiaries (except the attorney gen-
eral) or their representatives under normal Uniform Trust Code
rules, and all advisors or protectors of the original trust at least
sixty days before the effective date. 6
A trustee or beneficiary may seek court approval or disapproval
of a proposed decanting." If the original trust was subject to the
jurisdiction of the commissioner of accounts, the second trust also
Supp. 2012)).
52. Id. § 64.2-778.1(C)(8) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(C)(8) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
53. Id. § 64.2-778.1(A), (D) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(A), (D) (Inter-
im Supp. 2012)).
54. Id. § 64.2-778.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(D) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
55. Id. § 64.2-778.1(F) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(F) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
56. Id. § 64.2-778.1(G) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(G) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
57. See id. § 64.2-778.1(I) (Rep]. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(I) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
must account to the commissioner unless the court orders other-
wise.5S
A decanting must be consistent with the fiduciary duties of the
trustee of the original trust. 9 It will be treated for all purposes as
an exercise of a power not exercisable in favor of the trustee indi-
vidually or the trustee's creditors, estate, or estate creditors."0 De-
canting is permissible even if the trust instrument prohibits
amendment or revocation or contains a spendthrift provision."'
Normal provisions of the rule against perpetuities under Virginia
Code sections 55-12.1 through 55-13.3 continue to apply.62
The new Virginia decanting statute, which incorporates many
of the same provisions enacted by other states, is intended to bal-
ance the flexibility of decanting with safeguards for trust benefi-
ciaries and trustees. Despite the relative clarity that the new
statute brings to state law, it seems unlikely that decanting will
be widely used until the Internal Revenue Service completes a
project, currently underway, to examine the income and transfer
tax effects of decanting and issues clear guidance on those
points. 3
F, Real Estate Conveyance by Nonresident Fiduciary
Personal representatives and testamentary trustees generally
can exercise their powers only within the jurisdiction of the court
that appointed them. Thus, at least since June 30, 1986, fiduciar-
ies appointed by courts outside of Virginia have been unable to
58. Id. § 64.2-778.1(J) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(J) (Interim Supp.
2012)).
59. Id. § 64.2.778.1(E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(E)(1) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
60. Id. § 64.2-778.1(E)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(E)(2) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
61. Id. § 64.2-778.1(E)(4) (Rep!. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(E)(4) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
62. Id. § 64.2-778.1(E)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 55-548.16:1(E)(3) (Interim
Supp. 2012)).
63. I.R.S. Notice 2011-101, 2011-52 I.R.B. 932. The IRS will continue to issue private
letter rulings on proposed decantings that do not change beneficial interests or the appli-
cable rule against perpetuities. Id. It is seeking comments on issues such as the federal
transfer tax effects of changes in the identities of trust beneficiaries or their respective
interests, changes in situs or governing law, transfers from grantor trusts to non-grantor
trusts or vice versa, changes that affect generation-skipping transfer tax exemption, and
requirements for consent of beneficiaries or government officials. Id.
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deal with Virginia real estate without the involvement of an an-
cillary administrator qualified in the court where the real estate
is located. "
As of July 1, 2012, however, an executor or trustee under a will
probated according to the laws of another state can convey valid
title to the decedent's Virginia real estate without the signature
of a Virginia ancillary fiduciary if (i) the executor or trustee is du-
ly qualified in the state where the will was probated, (ii) the will
was duly executed in accordance with Virginia law, and (iii) an
authenticated copy is admitted to probate in the county or city in
which all or any part of the real estate is situated.65 The rule ex-
pressly validates transfers occurring as long ago as June 30,
1986.66
G. Out-of-State Trust Institutions
The 2011 General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
6.2-1001 and 6.2-1014 to expressly authorize a national banking
association supervised by the federal comptroller of the currency
to engage in trust business and serve as a fiduciary in the Com-
monwealth, even if the association did not have an office within
the Commonwealth. 7 That legislation was intended to contradict
a 2003 attorney general's opinion holding that the Federal Na-
tional Bank Act did not preempt a Virginia law purporting to bar
64. Virginia Code section 64.1-149 validates sales of Virginia real property made be-
fore June 30, 1986, by nonresident executors who did not first qualify in this state, provid-
ed the decedent's will was executed in accordance with Virginia law, conferred a power of
sale on the executor, and was duly probated in the other state, and an authenticated copy
of the will was probated in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-524(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (for-
merly id. § 64.1-149 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). However, any sale entered into on or after June 30,
1986, required someone to qualify as ancillary administrator in Virginia in order to sign
the deed of conveyance. Id. § 64.1-150 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
65. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 61, 2012 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-150 (Interim Supp. 2012)) (recodified effective Oct. 1, 2012, at id. § 64.2-
524(B) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
66. Id. Note, though, that like section 64.1-149, the new rule expressly applies to "any
conveyance of real estate," but also refers to "such sale," a phrase that can be read to limit
its application to transfers for valuable consideration. Id. This could exclude, for example,
a conveyance of property by an executor in satisfaction of a formula bequest or an author-
ized distribution by a testamentary trustee to a beneficiary. In addition, neither the prior
law nor the new version addresses the authority of the administrator of an intestate estate
to deal with property in the Commonwealth without qualifying here. These gaps should be
addressed in future legislative sessions.
67. Act of Mar. 14, 2011, ch. 67, 2011 Va. Acts 130 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 6.2-1001, -1014 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
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out-of-state national banks from engaging in trust business in
Virginia without maintaining a Virginia office."0 Unfortunately,
the 2011 amendment did not make clear whether the term "na-
tional banking association" included both national banks and fed-
eral savings banks. A 2012 amendment confirms that both types
of federal institutions are indeed authorized to engage in trust
business in Virginia even if they have no offices in the Common-
wealth.69
H. Sums Distributed By/Through Court
Administering an estate, trust, or conservatorship can be a
time-consuming and expensive process, regardless of the amount
involved. If a beneficiary cannot be found, refuses to accept a dis-
tribution, or cannot accept the distribution due to minority or in-
capacity, the fiduciary might find it necessary to continue the
administration for as long as a single asset remains. Fortunately,
in certain situations, Virginia Code section 8.01-606 permits fidu-
ciaries and others to pay small amounts into the circuit court for
eventual distribution, or to make the distributions themselves
without the intervention of a guardian or further accounting."
The maximum amount that could be handled in this fashion has
increased over the years. In 1995, it was $10,000;1 in 2003, it be-
came $15,000.72 The General Assembly increased it once more in
2012 to $25,000, effective July 1, 2012.v8
I. Mutual Liability for Necessaries
A Virginia spouse generally is not personally liable for the oth-
er spouse's debts, even those that arose during the marriage. 4
However, unless the couple is permanently living separate and
apart, the common law doctrine of necessaries makes a spouse li-
68. See generally Gray & Ramsey, supra note 19, at 251-52 (discussing out-of-state
institutions as trustees).
69. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 608, 2012 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 6.2-1001, -1014, -1067 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
71. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1995).
72. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2003).
73. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 43, 2012 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
74. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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able for the other spouse's debts that were incurred for that
spouse's own sustenance or support.75 Virginia Code section 55-37
protects a married couple's principal residence from debtor claims
under the doctrine of necessaries so long as they own it as ten-
ants by the entireties."s The 2012 General Assembly amended sec-
tion 55-37 to continue that protection after either spouse's death,
so long as the tenancy by the entireties terminated as a result of
the death.77
J. Notice About Death Benefits After Divorce
Spouses who divorce sometimes neglect to update their respec-
tive beneficiary designations to remove the former spouse. In
1993, the General Assembly decided to help by automatically re-
voking any revocable designation naming a former spouse as the
beneficiary of a death benefit under any written contract when
the divorce or annulment decree is entered.8 Although effective
for life insurance contracts, annuities, deferred compensation
agreements, and the like, the state law was preempted by specific
requirements for changing beneficiary designations under appli-
cable federal laws.5
After a previous attempt to circumvent the preemption problem
failed,0 the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 20-
75. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 ((9th ed. 2009).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
77. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 45, 2012 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 2012)). Clearly, a rule that is intended to ensure one spouse pro-
vides for the other's basic needs should not allow a creditor to force the "poor" spouse from
his home when attempting to collect. The continued statutory protection is available, how-
ever, regardless of which spouse is the survivor. While the equities depend on the facts of
each case, the General Assembly appears to have concluded that a bright line rule was
best.
78. Act of Mar. 22, 1993. ch. 417, 1993 Va. Acts 487 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
111.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
79. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001) (finding a
similar Washington statute preempted "to the extent it applie[d] to ERISA plans").
80. See Act of Mar. 12, 2007, ch. 306, 2007 Va. Acts 432 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-111.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)) (providing that, in the case of federal preemp-
tion, a former spouse-who receives payment of any death benefit to which he would not
otherwise be entitled if section 20-111.1 were given effect-is personally liable for the same
amount to the person(s) who would have been entitled to the benefit if the statute had not
been preempted). The Supreme Court of Virginia recently held that this statute, which is
not entirely displaced by federal law, is nevertheless preempted because it actually con-
flicts with the federal law. See Maretta v. Hillman, 283 Va. 34, 45, 722 S.E.2d 32, 37
(2012); infra Part III.B.
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111.1 in 2012 to require decrees of divorce or annulment to con-
tain a specific statutory notice about beneficiary designations."' In
conspicuous, bold print, every decree entered on or after July 1,
2012, must advise the parties that entry of the decree may or may
not revoke any designation of the former spouse as beneficiary of
a death benefit and that the parties are responsible for following
all beneficiary-change instructions given by the provider of the
benefit."
K. Agent's Authority Under Power of Attorney
The Virginia Uniform Power of Attorney Act specifies several
events that, unless the power of attorney provides otherwise, au-
tomatically terminate an agent's authority to deal with the prin-
cipal's property, including the filing of an action for divorce or
annulment of the agent's marriage to the principal or their legal
separation." The list of terminating events was extended in 2012
to include the filing of an action by either agent or principal for
separate maintenance or for custody of a child in common with
the other, as presumably these events would be equal evidence of
a breakdown in the agency relationship."
L. Land Trust Successor Trustees
By a 2011 amendment to Virginia Code section 55-17.1, the
beneficiaries of a land trust were empowered to name a successor
trustee when the trustee named in the deed conveying property to
the land trust declines to serve, resigns, is disqualified or re-
moved, or is adjudicated incapacitated and the deed does not
name a successor trustee.8 However, this amendment overlooked
the possibility that the relevant trust instrument might specify
another method for choosing a successor trustee. A 2012 amend-
ment confirms that in such an instance, the trust beneficiaries
81. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 493, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-111.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
83. Id. § 64.2-1608(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (formerly id. § 26-81(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2011))
84. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 57, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-81(B)(3) (Supp. 2012) (recodified effective Oct. 1, 2012, at id. § 64.2-1608(B)(3)
(Repl. Vol. 2012)).
85. See Gray & Ramsey, supra note 19, at 251 (citing Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 661,
2011 Va. Acts 1076 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 2011))).
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may name a successor only if the trust instrument does not name
a successor and neither the deed nor the trust instrument speci-
fies the procedure for doing so."
M. Notary Conflicts of Interests
The 2011 General Assembly also amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 47.1-30 to prohibit a notary from notarizing a document
where the notary "is a signatory or is named in the document. 87
But in doing so, it created an ambiguity as to whether someone
who is nominated only as a fiduciary in a will, trust, power of at-
torney, or otherwise specifically identified by name in any way,
could act as notary."' A 2012 amendment partially corrected the
problem by confirming that an individual named in a document
for the purpose of receiving notices or named as executor, trustee
or other fiduciary is not, for that reason alone, precluded from
performing notarial acts with respect to the document.9
Unfortunately, whether intentional or not, the change would
seem to make it more likely that a person who is named in the
document for some other reason (such as to serve as trust advisor
or merely to provide a recommendation to the executor or trustee
as to someone who might provide future services to the estate or
trust) may not serve as a notary.
N. Tax Exemption for Principal Residence of Disabled Veteran
Perhaps in a sign of the times, the 2012 General Assembly
passed not one but two separate bills addressing real property tax
issues for disabled veterans." Although not directly related to
wills, trusts, or estates, at least one of the changes is worth not-
ing because it responds to a Virginia attorney general's opinion
which held that the property tax exemption under section 58.1-
3219.5 was available only to veterans who own their residences
86. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 558, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-17.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
87. Act of Mar. 28, 2011 ch. 746, 2011 Va. Acts 1249 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 47.1-30 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
88. See Gray & Ramsey, supra note 19, at 252-53.
89. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 566, 2012 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 47.1-30 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
90. S.B. 540, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2012); H.B. 922, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2012).
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outright."1 The General Assembly confirmed that the tax exemp-
tion was, in fact, intended also to be available to disabled veter-
ans and their spouses who hold their principal residence in sev-
eral other forms besides fee simple, namely: (i) a tenancy for life,
(ii) an inter vivos trust that the veteran or spouse can revoke, or
(iii) an irrevocable trust in which the veteran or spouse has a life
estate or estate for joint lives or a continuing right of use and
support.92 A disabled veteran (and spouse) may claim a partial ex-
emption in certain situations if someone else who does not qualify
for the exemption holds an interest in the property;93 but exemp-
tion is not available for a leasehold interest or term of years.94
III. CASES
A. Transferability of LLC Interests
Many estate planning lawyers may have assumed that a mem-
bership interest in a limited liability company ("LLC") is personal
property that can pass in its entirety under the deceased owner's
will, subject only to any transferability restrictions contained in
the LLC operating agreement. The Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Ott v. Monroe serves as a reminder that such assump-
tions can be misplaced. "
In Ott, Mr. and Mrs. Monroe were the only members of a Vir-
ginia LLC.9" The operating agreement that governed the LLC's af-
fairs declared, among other things, that Mrs. Monroe would be
the managing member.97 It also included a general prohibition
against transferring a membership interest except as permitted
by the agreement." Permitted transfers included those made to
"[o]ther Members [or] [t]he spouse, children or other descendants
91. Op. to Hon. John M. O'Bannon, III, et a. (July 15, 2011). This ruling was of con-
cern because it could have limited veterans' estate planning options for what is typically
one of their largest assets.
92. Act of Mar. 13, 2012, ch. 263, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-3219.5(D) (Cum. Supp. 2012)); Act of Mar. 6, 2012, ch. 75, 2012 Va. Acts __
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3219.5(D) (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1.3219.5(E) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
94. Id. § 58.1-3219.5(D) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
95. 282 Va. 403, 719 S.E.2d 309 (2011).
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of any Member," as well as to any other non-member "by death,
intestacy, devise, or otherwise by operation of law" or with the
other members' unanimous written consent.99
Mr. Monroe died the following year."0 His will left his entire es-
tate, including his eighty percent membership interest in the
LLC, to his daughter, Janet Ott."' Ms. Ott subsequently sought a
declaratory judgment that her father's interest entitled her to
participate as a member in the company's governance. 2 The cir-
cuit court, however, agreed with Mrs. Monroe that her husband
was dissociated from the LLC upon his death by operation of Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-1040.1(7)(a), which terminated his right
as a member to participate in the LLC's affairs." Consequently,
Ms. Ott could inherit only her father's economic rights in the LLC
as a permitted assignee.04
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia first reviewed the
statutory context of the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act
(the "LLC Act"),0 and noted that, for tax reasons, the LLC Act
was intended to avoid the free transferability of a member's own-
ership interest."6 Like the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act,' 0 7 on
which it was based, the LLC Act implicitly recognizes that a
membership interest has two distinct components: (i) a control in-
terest that entitles the holder to participate with other members
in administering the LLC, and (ii) a financial interest that enti-
tles the holder only to share profits and losses and to receive dis-
tributions."'
The court noted that while Virginia law generally allows as-
signment of an LLC membership interest, the statute is clear
that the assignee receives only a right to share in profits, losses,
and distributions, and not a right to participate in LLC manage-
99. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 406-07, 719 S.E.2d at 310.
103. Id. at 407, 719 S.E.2d at 310.
104. Id.; See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1040.1(7)(a), -1040.2 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp.
2012).
105. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1001 to -1080 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
106. Ott, 282 Va. at 408, 719 S.E.2d at 311.
107. Ott, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.79 to .73.150 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
108. 282 Va. at 408-09, 719 S.E.2d at 311-12.
20121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ment."'s An assignee may become a member only by consent of a
majority of the member-managers, or if none, by a majority of the
members, unless the LLC's articles of organization or operating
agreement provides otherwise."0
Ms. Ott argued that the terms of the Monroes' operating
agreement did indeed "provide otherwise" and expressly contem-
plated that she would become a member by inheritance."' The
court observed, however, that the couple's agreement merely pro-
hibited certain transfers while permitting others, but it did not
address the effect of a member's dissociation on the nature of his
or her membership interest."2 Thus, the agreement did not ex-
pressly override the statutory rule that a dissociated member's
successor, chosen by whatever means, is entitled only to the for-
mer member's financial interest.
113
The court also noted that Virginia Code section 13.1-1023(A)
prohibits operating agreement provisions that are inconsistent
with state law and section 13.1-1039(A) allows assignment only of
a member's economic interest."' The Monroes' operating agree-
ment therefore could override only the statutory default re-
strictions on assignment of a financial interest, not the statutory
rule prohibiting an assignee from participating in LLC manage-
ment, becoming a member, or exercising membership rights
without the consent of a majority of members."5
The Ott decision should prompt drafting attorneys to review
current operating agreements to be sure the transfer provisions
accurately reflect the client's intent regarding a permitted as-
signee's right to be admitted to membership in the LLC. Alt-
109. Id. at 409, 719 S.E.2d at 312 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1039(A) (Repl. Vol.
2011 & Supp. 2012) ("Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an oper-
ating agreement, a membership interest in a limited liability company is assignable in
whole or in part .... An assignment does not entitle the assignee to participate in the
management and affairs of the limited liability company or to become or to exercise any
rights of a member. Such an assignment entitles the assignee to receive, to the extent as-
signed, only any share of profits and losses and distributions to which the assignor would
be entitled,")).
110. Id. at 409-10, 719 S.E.2d at 312 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1040(A) (Rept. Vol.
2010 & Supp. 2012)).
111. Id. at 410, 719 S.E.2d at 312.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 410-11, 719 S.E.2d at 312-13.
115. Id.
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hough, as the court made clear, the agreement cannot simply
override the statute in this regard, it should be possible for the
members to agree to give their consent in appropriate circum-
stances.
B. Validity of Virginia's Anti-Preemption Statute
Maretta v. Hillman considered on appeal whether a surviving
spouse had an enforceable claim under Virginia law for an
amount equal to the proceeds of the decedent's federal group life
insurance policy, which were paid to the decedent's former spouse
pursuant to a pre-divorce beneficiary designation."'
When Ms. Hillman's husband died, the federal government
paid almost $125,000 in group life insurance benefits to his ex-
wife, Ms. Maretta, pursuant to a beneficiary designation the de-
cedent made during their marriage and never revoked."' Ms.
Hillman obtained a personal judgment against Ms. Maretta for
the full amount of the proceeds based on Virginia Code sections
20-111.1(A) and 20-111.1(D), as in effect at Ms. Hillman's
death."' In relevant part, those sections provided:
(A) Upon the entry of a decree of annulment or divorce from the bond
of matrimony ... any revocable beneficiary designation contained in
a then existing written contract owned by one party that provides for
the payment of any death benefit to the other party is revoked. A
death benefit prevented from passing to a former spouse by this sec-
tion shall be paid as if the former spouse had predeceased the dece-
dent.
9
(D) If this section is preempted by federal law with respect to the
payment of any death benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, re-
ceives the payment of any death benefit that the former spouse is not
entitled to under this section is personally liable for the amount of
the payment to the person who would have been entitled to it were
this section not preempted.
1 20
116. 283 Va. 34, 37, 722 S.E.2d 32, 33 (2012).
117. Id. at 39, 722 S.E.2d at 33.
118. Id. at 39-40, 722 S.E.2d at 34.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
120. Id. § 20-111.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2008). Subsection (D) was added in 2007 as a legisla-
tive response to Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Briener, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), which indicated
that federal law would likely preempt the general rule stated in subsection (A), automati-
cally revoking beneficiary designations in favor of a former spouse. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S.
at 143 (holding that federal law preempted Washington statute similar to Virginia Code
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Both parties acknowledged that federal law preempted Virgin-
ia Code section 20-111.1(A) because it would allow insurance pro-
ceeds to be paid to someone other than the designated benefi-
ciary.' The only question, therefore, was whether Virginia Code
section 20-111.1(D) similarly was preempted, even though it does
not affect the direct payment of benefits but merely allows others
to recover from the beneficiary an amount equal to the proceeds
so paid.'2
In considering Ms. Maretta's appeal of the circuit court judg-
ment against her under section 20-111.1(D), the court first noted
that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
makes federal law the supreme law of the land, rendering con-
flicting state laws without effect. 2' It also noted that preemption
can occur from explicit statutory language, from implied congres-
sional intent, or where state law is an obstacle to fully accom-
plishing congressional purposes and objectives.12 ' Thus, the court
reasoned that section 20-111.1(D) must be preempted if Congress
intended federal insurance benefits to belong to the designated
beneficiary to the exclusion of all others.'
Analogizing to cases interpreting other federal insurance stat-
utes, the court found that Congress did not intend for a named
beneficiary to receive federal insurance proceeds, only then to
have to pay them to a third party under state law."6 By creating
what was essentially a beneficial interest in someone other than
the named beneficiary, the Virginia statute effectively would nul-
lify the insured's right to name a beneficiary and frustrate the
congressional purpose."7 The court therefore reversed the circuit
court and entered judgment for Ms. Maretta.
section 20-111.1).
121. See Maretta, 283 Va. at 41, 722 S.E.2d at 35.
122. Id. at 40-42, 722 S.E.2d at 34-35.
123. Id. at 40, 722 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Altria Grp., Inc. v.
Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
124. See id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152-53 (1982)).
125. Id. at 42, 722 S.E.2d at 35 (citing de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153).
126. Id. at 44, 722 S.E.2d at 37.
127. Id. at 45, 722 S.E.2d at 37 (quoting Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 60 (1981);
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659 (1950)).
128. Id. at 46, 722 S.E.2d at 38.
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In reaching its decision, the court did not follow other states'
courts, which generally have held that the federal insurance stat-
ute does not prevent state law from imposing a constructive trust
on the proceeds for the benefit of someone other than the named
beneficiary. 29 It did not give the same weight as those courts to
the fact that the federal insurance statute applicable to Ms. Hill-
man's claim, unlike the statutes involved in the other cases on
which the court relied, did not prohibit attachment of the pro-
ceeds.'
Two justices dissented, arguing that there is a "high threshold"
for preemption and that courts should start with the presumption
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law, particularly
where a state is exercising its police power in the area of domestic
relations.'' They argued that the federal rule was enacted pri-
marily for administrative convenience and that the Virginia stat-
ute provides only an equitable remedy that does no major damage
to the federal interest in facilitating payment of insurance pro-
ceeds."2 Unlike the majority, the dissenters also attributed signif-
icance to the absence of an anti-attachment provision in the fed-
eral insurance statute at issue, indicating that Congress did not
intend to preempt state law entirely."'
Ms. Hillman filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Su-
preme Court of the United States on April 11, 2012.13
C. Testamentary Capacity; Undue Influence
While awaiting surgery for a life-threatening condition in 2008,
Dorothy Weedon contacted the office of the lawyer who had
drawn two previous wills for her. She spoke with the same legal
129. Id. at 45, 722 S.E.2d at 37 (citations omitted).
130. Id.
131. id. at 47, 722 S.E.2d at 38 (McClanahan, J., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. State Conf.
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995)) (citing
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S., -, 131 S. Ct. 196B, 1985
(2011)).
132. Id. at 50, 722 S.E.2d at 40 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987)).
133. Id. at 52-53, 722 S.E.2d at 41 ('The omission of an anti-attachment clause in
FEGLIA should thus be viewed as answering in the negative the question of whether Con-
gress intended to preempt a state law like Code § 20-111.1(D)--one that impacts FEGLI
benefits, if at all, only after the benefits have been paid to the designated beneficiary.").
134. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hillman v. Maretta, No. 11-1221 (Va. Apr. 11,
2012), 2011 U.S. Briefs 1221.
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assistant who had worked with her in each prior instance.1 3 The
lawyer, relying on his long-time assistant's judgment that Mrs.
Weedon was capable of making a will, prepared a new will with-
out speaking directly with the client.36 The will left Mrs.
Weedon's entire estate to her daughter, Mary Ann, while exclud-
ing her other four children. '37
In the presence of Mary Ann and three hospital employees who
served as witnesses and notary, Mrs. Weedon executed her new
will at the hospital the day before her surgery. ' She died shortly
after the surgery, and the four disinherited children challenged
the will on the grounds that their mother lacked testamentary
capacity and that the will was a product of Mary Ann's undue in-
fluence.'39
At trial, Mary Ann produced the notary and witnesses, who
testified that they did not remember the specific facts surround-
ing the execution but that they would not have participated if
they had doubted Mrs. Weedon's capacity.'40 One of the witnesses
apparently had to convince Mary Ann to facilitate her mother's
wish to amend her will before surgery so that the elderly woman's
mind could be at ease.' 4 ' The lawyer's assistant and a close friend
of the testatrix also testified that the decedent had made it clear
to them that the will reflected her intent and wishes.
4 2
In contrast, the contestants presented evidence that their
mother's health had been deteriorating, that she was occasionally
disoriented in the weeks before her death, and that she frequent-
ly did not seem to recognize her children or grandchildren.'43
Their expert witness, a local medical examiner who had reviewed
their mother's file, opined that someone with her medical history
would have been confused with intervals of lucidity and would
135. Weedon v. Weedon, 283 Va. 241, 245-47, 720 S.E.2d 552, 554-55 (2012).
136. Id. at 248, 720 S.E.2d at 555.
137. See id. at 247-48, 720 S.E.2d at 555.
138. Id. at 248-49, 720 S.E.2d at 555-56.
139. Id. at 247, 720 S.E.2d at 556.
140. Id. at 248, 720 S.E.2d at 555-56.
141. Id. at 247, 720 S.E.2d at 554.
142. Id. at 247-48, 250, 720 S.E.2d at 555-57.
143. Id. at 249-50, 720 S.E.2d at 556.
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have been capable of only limited communication.' The contest-
ants also produced evidence that Mary Ann had attempted to re-
strict her siblings' access to their mother and her doctors.'45 They
admitted, though, that Mrs. Weedon was very concerned about
and protective of Mary Ann,40 and they did not claim that Mary
Ann unduly influenced their mother with respect to her two prior
wills, which had favored Mary Ann and omitted first one, and
then two, of the other children.' 7
Based upon the evidence presented, the circuit court held that
Mary Ann had not carried her burden as proponent of the will to
prove testamentary capacity and that the contestants had proved
undue influence by clear and convincing evidence.'48 It therefore
ruled that the 2008 will had been impeached and that the latest
prior will should proceed to probate.'
On appeal,'0 the court noted that when testamentary capacity
is questioned, great weight is to be given to the testimony of the
drafter, the attesting witnesses, and the attending physician.'5' It
dismissed as unsupported by law the trial court's apparent belief
that "the weight ascribed to the testimony of the professional
speaking to the testatrix for the purpose of drafting the will is
144. Id. at 249, 720 S.E.2d at 556.
145. Id. at 250, 720 S.E.2d at 556.
146. Id. at 249, 720 S.E.2d at 556.
147. Id. at 257-58, 720 S.E.2d at 561.
148. Id. at 251, 720 S.E.2d at 557.
149. Id. at 252, 720 S.E.2d at 557.
150. The court first summarized the proper legal analysis:
The proponent of a will bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that at the time the testatrix executed her will she possessed testa-
mentary capacity .... [T]he proponent of the will is entitled to a presumption
that testamentary capacity existed by proving compliance with all statutory
requirements for the valid execution of the will. Once the presumption exists,
the contestant then bears the burden of going forward with evidence to over-
come this presumption, although the burden of persuasion remains with the
proponent.
Id., 720 S.E.2d at 558 (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 239 Va. 197, 199-200, 387 S.E.2d 499, 500-
01 (1990)). Because the parties did not question the validity of the will's execution, the
court found that the burden of proof had shifted to the four children who opposed it. Id. at
253, 720 S.E.2d at 558. It then assumed, without deciding, that the other children's evi-
dence was sufficient to overcome their burden and so focused on the sufficiency of Mary
Ann's evidence as to capacity. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Parish v. Parish, 281 Va. 191, 200, 704 S.E.2d 99, 105 (2011).
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lessened if that person does not actually draft the will." 5' The su-
preme court also found that the trial court erred in (i) placing un-
due weight on the fact that Mrs. Weedon did not place the call to
the attorney herself, even though she did speak personally with
the assistant, and (ii) favoring the testimony of the contestants
and their expert witness, who were not present when the will was
executed, over the testimony of those who were actually in the
room at the relevant time."3
With regard to the undue influence claim, the court acknowl-
edged that a presumption of undue influence arose against Mary
Ann because Mrs. Weedon was old and infirm, stood in a relation-
ship of confidence or dependence with Mary Ann, and had shown
an intention in prior wills to dispose of her property in another
manner."4 It found, however, that the assistant's testimony about
Mrs. Weedon's intent and the friend's testimony about the dece-
dent's statements were sufficient to overcome the presumption.1'
Noting that the ultimate burden of proof is always on the party
alleging fraud, the court found that the trial court improperly fo-
cused on evidence that raised the presumption, while overlooking
the ultimate inquiry-whether Dorothy's will was overridden to
the extent that she was "in the attitude of saying: It is not my will
but I must do it.""' Finding that Mary Ann had produced suffi-
cient evidence to rebut the presumption, the court held that the
other children had failed to carry their burden to prove the exist-
ence of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence, and or-
dered the contested will admitted to probate."'
Two justices filed separate dissents, each arguing that the
court should have let the trial court's finding on undue influence
stand because it was neither plainly wrong nor without evidence
to support it."'5
152. Id. at 253-54, 720 S.E.2d at 558.
153. Id. at 254, 720 S.E.2d at 559.
154. Id. at 255, 720 S.E.2d at 559.
155. Id. at 258, 720 S.E.2d at 561.
156. Id. at 256-57, 720 S.E.2d at 560 (quoting Gill v. Gill, 219 Va. 1101, 1105-06, 254
S.E.2d 122, 124 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. at 258-59, 720 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Gill, 219 Va. at 1105-06, 254 S.E.2d at
124).
158. Id. at 259, 720 S.E.2d at 561 (Mims, J., dissenting); id. at 261, 720 S.E.2d at 563
(McClanahan, J., dissenting).
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D. Effect of Mirror-Image Wills
In Keith v. Lulofs, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
circuit court's decision that a couple's execution of wills with mir-
ror-image terms did not create a contract that prevented the sur-
vivor from amending her will after the first spouse's death."'
Mr. and Mrs. Keith executed mutual and reciprocal wills that
left the estate of the first spouse to die to the surviving spouse
and the estate of the survivor in equal shares to each spouse's
child from a prior marriage."' Several years later, they also
bought an insurance policy and named their respective children
as co-beneficiaries. 6'
After Mr. Keith died, however, Mrs. Keith signed a new will,
which left her entire estate, including assets received from Mr.
Keith, to her daughter, Venocia.' She also named Venocia sole
beneficiary of the insurance policy.' Not surprisingly, Mr.
Keith's son, Walter, challenged the probate of his step-mother's
new will after her later death.' 4
At trial, Walter testified that his father had told him the couple
intended to divide their estates equally between the two chil-
dren. ' He also said Mrs. Keith had told him they had made the
life insurance policy payable to both children equally so the chil-
dren would not fight over money after their parents had died.66
Unfortunately for Walter, the drafting attorney could not recall
any of the wills or the circumstances under which they were pre-
pared. 7 Venocia testified only that she remembered a conversa-
tion about the life insurance policy but could not recall its sub-
stance.68 The trial court found Walter's evidence insufficient to
establish a contractual agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Keith
159. 283 Va. 768, 770-72, 724 S.E.2d 695, 696-97 (2012).
160. Id. at 770-71, 724 S.E.2d at 696.
161. Id. at 771, 724 S.E.2d at 696.
162. Id.
163. Id., 724 S.E.2d at 696-97.
164. Id., 724 S.E.2d at 696.
165. Id., 724 S.E.2d at 697.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 771-72, 724 S.E.2d at 697.
168. Id. at 771, 724 S.E.2d at 697.
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regarding the ultimate disposition of their estates, and thus ac-
cepted Mrs. Keith's later will to probate. 69
On appeal, Walter repeated his argument that the "mirror-
image" nature of the earlier wills or, in the alternative, corrobora-
tive evidence proved that the testators intended their wills to be
irrevocable. 17 In rejecting this claim and affirming the lower
court, the Supreme Court of Virginia pointed out that wills gen-
erally are unilaterally revocable and modifiable until the testa-
tor's death. 7' While reciprocal provisions for third parties can be
sufficient consideration for a binding contract, it first must be
shown by clear and satisfactory evidence that the testators in-
tended to make a contract. 7' Such evidence may be in the form of
express language in the wills, competent witness testimony re-
garding admissions by the testators, or relevant circumstances
and relationships that are sufficient to support an implied con-
tract.'73 The court reasoned that:
[w]hen an estate in fee simple is devised in one part of a will, by
clear and unambiguous words, such estate is not diminished nor de-
stroyed by terms contained in another part of the instrument, unless
such terms which reduce the estate be as clear and decisive as the
words by which it was created.
74
On the facts Walter presented, the court found no clear and
convincing evidence that the Keiths intended to form a binding
contract, and it refused to hold that the mirror-image nature of
their wills, without more, established one.175 Otherwise, the court
explained, "any testator who executes a will that 'mirrors' anoth-
er will and contains language similar to that contained in the
[Keiths'] wills.., would be unintentionally hamstrung by the
death of the purportedly reciprocal testator," and possibly unable
to provide for any future spouse or for a child born or adopted
during a later marriage."'
169. Id. at 771-72, 724 S.E.2d at 697.
170. Id. at 772, 724 S.E.2d at 697.
171. Id. at 772-73, 724 S.E.2d at 697 (citing Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 646, 96
S.E. 749, 750 (1918)).
172. See id. at 773, 724 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting Salley v. Burns, 220 Va. 123, 131, 255
S.E.2d 512, 516 (1979)).
173. See id. (quoting Salley, 220 Va. at 131-32, 255 S.E.2d at 516-17).
174. Id. at 774, 724 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting Salley, 220 Va. at 134, 255 S.E.2d at 518).
175. Id. at 775-76, 724 S.E.2d at 699.
176. Id. at 775, 724 S.E.2d at 699.
[Vol. 47:343
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
The court further held that Walter's testimony was insufficient
under the so-called dead man's statute, Virginia Code section
8.01-397, which prohibits entry of a judgment or decree against a
party incapable of testifying (or that party's personal representa-
tive) in favor of an adverse or interested party based on the lat-
ter's uncorroborated testimony.17 7 While the nature and quantity
of the requisite corroboration will vary from case to case, Walter
failed to present any independent evidence or testimony that ac-
tually supported his own claims regarding the testators' intent
when they executed their wills.
78
E. Effect of Adult Adoption
The appeal in Kummer v. Donak considered whether the adop-
tion of an adult has the same effect on intestate succession rights
as the adoption of a minor. 179
An intestate decedent had no surviving spouse, children, par-
ents, or siblings; but she was survived by three children of a de-
ceased sister.8° The deceased sister, however, had been adopted
as an adult by her aunt by marriage.' On the administrator's pe-
tition for aid and direction and motion for rule to show cause
against distribution, the circuit court held that the decedent's
nephews and niece were not her heirs at law because the sister's
adoption had severed their legal ties to the decedent and her es-
tate.1
2
On appeal by the sister's children, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia first noted that, for purposes of establishing a parent-child
relationship under the intestate succession rules, Virginia Code
section 64.1-5.1 unambiguously declares that an adopted person
is to be considered the child of the adopting parent and not of the
biological parents."8 3 The children maintained that the statute did
177. Id. at 775-76, 724 S.E.2d at 699.
178. Id. at 776, 724 S.E.2d at 699.




183. See id. at 304, 715 S.E.2d at 9.
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not apply in the instant case because their inheritance rights de-
pended only on establishing that their mother and the decedent
were sisters, not parent and child.1 4 The court pointed out, how-
ever, that the necessary sibling relationship could be established
only by showing that the decedent and the deceased biological sis-
ter had a common parent. '85 It found the statutory language un-
ambiguous and so concluded that the adoption established the
sister as solely the child of her adopting parent, thus terminating
the legal relationship between the decedent and her sister for
purposes of intestate succession."'
The court found no inconsistency between the intestacy statute
and Virginia Code section 63.2-1215, which delineates the legal
effects of adoption.8 7 The latter declares that blood relatives and
family members of the adopted person are "divested of all legal
rights" and that the person is to be "to all intents and purposes"
the child of the adopting parent.' The court also rejected the
children's public policy argument that intestate succession should
favor blood relatives. Explaining that public policy is the preroga-
tive of the General Assembly, with the judiciary charged only
with interpreting the words in the statute, the court held that the
children's argument must fail because there is "no ambiguity in
the applicable statutes.""'8
The children also attempted to convince the court that adult
adoption should not be given the same legal effect as the adoption
of a child because the former is motivated primarily by financial
considerations.'90 The court was unconvinced, noting that the
plain language of Virginia's adult adoption statute declares that
the "adoption of an adult shall have the same effect as adoption of
a child," and that the intestacy statute itself refers to any "adopt-
ed person" rather than distinguishing between children and
adults.191
184. Id. 715 S.E.2d at 9.
185. Id. at 304-05, 715 S.E.2d at 9.
186. Id. at 305, 715 S.E.2d at 9.
187. Id. at 305-06, 715 S.E.2d at 9-10.
188. Id. at 305, 715 S.E.2d at 10; see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1215 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
189. Id. at 306, 715 S.E.2d at 10 (quoting Uniwest Constr., Inc. v. Amtech Elevator
Servs., Inc., 280 Va. 428, 440, 699 S.E.2d 223, 229 (2010)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 306-07, 715 S.E.2d at 10 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1243 (Repl. Vol.
2007)) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
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F. Effect of Pre-2008 Slayer Statute
The sole question before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Bell
ex rel. Bell v. Casper and Casper ex rel. Church v. Lynn was
whether the distribution of a decedent's estate is governed by
Virginia's "slayer statute" as in effect at the decedent's death or
as in effect on the date of the slayer's conviction.'92
The decedent was murdered in 2005 by her only child, who also
was the only beneficiary under her will.'93 She was survived by
her son's two children and her mother.' The son was convicted of
second-degree murder in 2009.195 Both children brought actions
seeking a declaratory judgment that the slayer statute applied to
cause them to be their grandmother's sole heirs.'96
The Virginia slayer statute in effect in 2005 provided that nei-
ther a slayer "nor any person claiming through him" could ac-
quire property from a slain decedent.'97 Before the son was con-
victed, however, the statute was amended to provide that one who
establishes kinship to the decedent by way of kinship to a slayer
is deemed to claim "from the decedent and not through the slay-
er."'98 The children's theory was that the applicable statute should
be the one in effect at the time the "slayer" is determined to be
such as a result of his murder conviction.'99 The circuit court con-
cluded that a conviction only designates someone as a "slayer" at
the time of the murder.0 Thus, it held that the decedent's mother
was the rightful heir to the decedent's estate.'
192. Bell ex rel. Bell v. Casper, 282 Va. 203, 209, 717 S.E.2d 783, 786 (2011).




197. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-402 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
198. Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 830, 2008 Va. Acts 1627 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-403 (Rep]. Vol. 2011)); Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 822, 2008 Va. Acts 1563 (codified
as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-403 (Repl. Vol. 2011)); see also Bell, 282 Va. at 207-08,
717 S.E.2d at 784-85.
199. Bell, 282 Va. at 208, 211, 717 S.E.2d at 785-86.
200. Id., 717 S.E.2d at 785.
201. Id.
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In considering the grandchildren's appeal, the Supreme Court
of Virginia noted that the distribution of an estate generally is
governed by the law in effect at the decedent's death.0 2 After a
lengthy analysis of the slayer statute's historical evolution and
the presumption against retroactive laws absent clear legislative
direction, the supreme court agreed with the trial court that the
version of the statute in effect at the time of the decedent's death
should govern.03 Thus, it concluded that the slayer statute in ef-
fect at the decedent's death in 2005 modified the then-effective in-
testate succession laws to disqualify the decedent's grandchil-
dren, who were claiming through their slayer father, and thereby
worked to pass the estate to the decedent's mother.0 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The 2012 session of the Virginia General Assembly clarified
and expanded existing trust rules by allowing settlors to shift fi-
duciary responsibility to trust directors, protect trust assets from
claims of the settlor's creditors, obtain reimbursement for trust-
related income taxes, and revise trust terms through decanting.
These changes should provide additional tools for estate planners,
although the utility of decanting in particular may be limited un-
til its federal tax consequences become clearer. The assembly also
addressed several other technical issues, including corrections to
2011 legislative actions. All were initially reflected in interim
pocket parts or supplements for volumes of the Code of Virginia,
and they appeared October 1, 2012, in a new title 64.2 that at-
tempts to consolidate all statutory provisions relating to wills,
trusts, estates and fiduciaries. New title 64.2 may require action
202. Id. at 211-12, 717 S.E.2d at 787.
203. Id. at 211-13, 717 S.E.2d at 786-88.
204. Id. at 213-14, 717 S.E.2d at 788. The court also rejected the grandchildren's ar-
gument that application of the slayer statute was inconsistent with Virginia Code section
55-4, which declares that "[n]o suicide, nor attainder of felony, shall work a corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-4 (Repi. Vol. 2007); Bell, 282 Va. at 214-
15, 717 S.E.2d at 788. That statute confirms that a felony conviction does not affect a per-
son's right to dispose of his own property. See Bell, 282 Va. at 214, 717 S.E.2d at 788. In
contrast, Virginia's slayer statute does not require a slayer to forfeit his own property; ra-
ther it merely prohibits a slayer from acquiring, through wrongdoing, additional property
that his heirs could subsequently claim through him. Id.
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in the 2013 session of the General Assembly if changes in the
wording or placement of particular statutes have resulted in un-
intended changes in their substance.
205. For example, subsection (B)(3) of Virginia Code section 64.2-747 inadvertently was
omitted. See supra note 19.
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